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Abstract
Sunk costs have been known to elicit violations of expected utility theory, in particular, the independence or cancellation
axiom. Separately, violations of the stochastic dominance principle have been demonstrated in various settings despite the
fact that descriptive models of choice favored in economics deem such violations irrational. However, it is currently unknown
whether sunk costs also yield stochastic dominance violations. In two studies using a tri-colored roulette wheel choice task
with non-equiprobable events yet equal payoffs, we observed that those who had sunk costs selected a stochastically dominated
option significantly more than did those who had no costs. Moreover, a second study revealed that people chose a stochastically
dominated option significantly more when the expected value was low compared to high. Amodel comparison of psychological
explanations demonstrated that theories that incorporate a reference shift of the status quo could predict these sunk cost-based
violations of stochastic dominance whereas other models could not.
Keywords: choice, decision, sunk cost, stochastic dominance, investment, status quo effect, prospect theory, risk, model fitting,
behavioral economics, reference shift
1 Introduction
In 2012 while working for JP Morgan, Bruno Iksil – oth-
erwise known as the “London Whale” – gained notoriety
when he was blamed for the loss of billions of dollars on
credit default swaps. Through investigating the timeline of
these losses, investigators discovered that when his initial in-
vestment decisions landed him substantially in the red, Iksil
took major risks to double down on the losses rather than
walk away. Instead of ignoring the sunk cost, Iksil scaled up
the risk of his financial investments in order to try to recover
from the initial losses (Hurtado, 2016).
Sunk costs refer to situations in which costs are irrevoca-
bly incurred regardless which future action is selected and,
because all actions are equally affected, they should have no
effect on decisions. However, the previous example demon-
strates the power that sunk costs wield over decisions. The
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sunk cost fallacy occurs when the presence of sunk costs re-
sults in the choosing of different actions compared to when
sunk costs are not present, thus violating the cancellation
or independence axiom of expected utility theory (Machina,
1989).
In one of the most famous experimental studies on the
sunk cost fallacy (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), two groups of
subjects were asked to imagine that they were president of
an airline company and then determine whether they would
spend the last $1 million of their research funds to develop
a plane that is undetectable by conventional radar. They are
further informed that a competitor has just begun selling a
similar plane that is both faster and more economical than
the plane their company can build. Critically, the first group
of subjects were informed that their firm had already spent
$9 million on the project but the second group was not. 85%
of the 48 subjects in the first group elected to continue with
the project whereas only 17% of the 60 subjects in the second
group chose to spend the funds, implicating the sunk costs
in causing the differential choice behavior. Sunk cost effects
have been found using a variety of experiments over multiple
distinct domains and populations, suggesting that this is a
reasonably well-supported effect in the literature (Navarro
& Fantino, 2005; Strough, Mehta, McFall & Schuller, 2015;
Tan & Yates, 1995; Zeng, Zhang, Chen, Yu & Gong, 2013).
Another element of rationality concerns the principle of
stochastic dominance. This principle asserts that no rational
individual or organization should ever choose a stochasti-
cally dominated option. Essentially, if option D never pays
less and sometimes pays more than option W, then we say
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that optionD stochastically dominates the weaker optionW.1
Rank dependent models of choice (Quiggin, 1982), which
are important for predicting economic behavior, retain this
principle, despite the fact that violations of stochastic domi-
nance have been observed in a variety of studies. This is not
merely an ivory tower problembecause, in itsmost simplified
form, a violation of dominance reduces to a situation where
an organization or individual prefers $8 over $10, all else be-
ing equal. The correct choice here is obvious. However, with
increasing complexity it becomes less clear, even though the
correct choice becomes no less dominant. Thus, violations
of stochastic dominance are usually observed in nontranspar-
ent situations or involve between-subject designs (Birnbaum
& Navarrete, 1998; Diederich & Busemeyer, 1999; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1986).
When Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced prospect
theory, mainstream economists eschewed it because it al-
lowed for violations of stochastic dominance. Though they
were aware of violations of stochastic dominance (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1986), they nonetheless released a revised
version of their model known as cumulative prospect the-
ory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) that no longer allowed for
violations of stochastic dominance.
1.1 Empirical observations of stochastic dom-
inance choice violations
However, violations of stochastic dominance continue to
emerge. That violations of stochastic dominance occur in
nontransparent designs is rather well-established. For exam-
ple, Tversky & Kahneman (1986) demonstrated that when
presented with the following pair of gambles,
Option TK(A): P($0)=.90, P($45)=.06,
P($30)=.01, P(−$15)=.01, P(−$15)=.02
Option TK(B): P($0)=.90, P($45)=.06,
P($45)=.01, P(−$10)=.01, P(−$15)=.02,
individuals overwhelmingly prefer the dominant option
TK(B). However, when the dominance of TK(B) is disguised
using a nontransparent design, such as,
Option TK(C): P($0)=.90, P($45)=.06,
P($30)=.01, P(−$15)=.03
Option TK(D): P($0)=.90, P($45)=.07,
P(−$10)=.01, P(−$15)=.02,
most subjects choose the weaker option, TK(C). The sub-
additivity principle of the probability weighting function of
prospect theory (Kahneman&Tversky, 1979) allows it to ac-
count for these findings, but only when using separable deci-
sion weights, as opposed to the cumulative decision weights
1Stochastic dominance is defined as P(D ≥ xi) ≥ P(W ≥ xi) for all
outcomes xi and the inequality between optionsD andW is strict for at least
one xi.
found in cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman,
1992). Another example violation of stochastic dominance
involving disguised dominance is demonstrated byBirnbaum
and Navarette (1998) wherein they elicited preferences for
the following two gambles:
Option BN(G+): P($12)=.05, P($14)=.05,
P($96)=.90
Option BN(G-): P($12)=.1, P($90)=.05,
P($96)=.85.
They observed that 73/100 subjects preferred BN(G-) over
BN(G+) despite the fact that G+ stochastically dominates, a
result predicted by configural weight theory (Birnbaum &
McIntosh, 1996). This is particularly interesting because
configural weight theory also uses rank-dependent weights
(like those used in cumulative prospect theory) on the out-
comes but in a different way than more traditional versions
(Quiggin, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Michael
Birnbaum and his lab have replicated such effectsmany times
(e.g., Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997; Birnbaum & Navarrete,
1998; Birnbaum, Patton & Lott, 1999).
Choice violations of stochastic dominance in transparent
designs are much rarer and usually have very small effect
sizes. For example, Diederich and Busemeyer (1999) pre-
sented evidence that subjects were significantly more likely
to choose a stochastically dominated option when the out-
comes were negatively correlated with those of the dominant
option compared to when they were positively correlated.2
However, the overall probability of choosing the weaker op-
tion was rather low (e.g., in the between-subjects design, the
more frequently chosen weaker option was only chosen 10%
of the time). The multi-attribute implementation of deci-
sion field theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Diederich
& Busemeyer, 1999) was used to model the results, as the
dynamic nature of the diffusion model – particularly, the
attention switching component coupled with competitive
evidence accumulation – yields increased selection of the
weaker option when payoffs are negatively correlated.
1.2 Other factors that may encourage viola-
tions of the stochastic dominance princi-
ple
Thus far, two primary ingredients in eliciting selection of a
Stochastically dominated option have been found: (1) dis-
guised dominance and (2) negatively correlated payoffs. But
do other factors affect an individual’s propensity to select a
2For example, for the positive correlation condition, when the dominant
option yielded a high valued outcome so did the weaker – though less high
— and when the former yielded a low valued outcome so did the latter.
For the negative correlation condition, when the dominant option yielded a
high valued outcome the weaker yielded a low value and when the dominant
yielded a low valued outcome the weaker yielded a high one.
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Reference Point at x=0 not attainable with sunk costs
x
Original reference
point at x=0 
without sunk 
costs
           v(x)
Shifted reference point
at x=(winning amount - sunk cost)
Figure 1: Incorporation of shifted reference point into prospect theory value function when sunk costs are present.
stochastically dominated option?3 One intriguing possibility
is the presence of sunk costs.
When subjects must financially invest before playing, their
choices are taking place in a state of loss where theoretical
and empirical work suggest theymight bemore prone toward
risk-seeking behavior (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt & l’Haridon,
2008; DeMartino, Kumaran, Seymour &Dolan, 2006; Levy
& Levy, 2002). Central to prospect theory is the idea that
people derive value from gains and losses measured relative
to a reference point. If no costs are present then individuals
view any positive earnings as a gain and any negative earn-
ings as losses with a reference point at zero. However, when
pre-existing costs are present (i.e., sunk costs), individuals
may no longer view a zero payoff as their reference point
since it is no longer a possibility. For example, any gamble
that requires a priori payment (hence, a sunk cost) will result
in a positive outcome only with a win. All other outcomes
are losses, and thus, a zero payoff is not attainable. The
sunk cost shifts the reference point such that individuals are
more willing to take risks to avoid the loss of not winning.
Sunk costs may cause the target reference point to become
the successful outcome (Figure 1). Due to the convexity of
the curves in the loss domain, the prospects of the weaker
option move nearer in value to the prospect of the domi-
nant option. Thus, we would expect to see the frequency of
stochastically dominated choices increase when sunk costs
are present relative to when no costs are present.
3Extending to the group domain, Charness, Karni and Levin (2007)
observed that individuals are more likely to violate stochastic dominance
than are groups.
1.3 Primary goals
First, our primary purpose was to test whether or not sunk
costs increase the likelihood ofmaking stochastic dominance
violations. Second, we then want to see whether models
which incorporate a shifted reference point are better at ac-
counting for such violations. Third, we wanted to explore
whether or not sunk cost effects still emerge when holding
the d’ or sensitivity index constant.
Originally conceived as a critical term for signal detection
theory, d’ represents the signal to noise ratio of a choice
(Green & Swets, 1966). In the context of a decision be-
tween two options, it corresponds to the difference in ex-
pected values of the options divided by their pooled standard
deviations. Interestingly, the d’ of a decision changes de-
pending on whether or not sunk costs are incorporated into
the decision. For example, in the aforementioned airplane
experiment (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), the d’ of the decision
situation when there is a sunk cost differs from the situa-
tion when there is no sunk cost. Thus, it is possible that
sunk cost effects are exacerbated or even driven by individ-
uals considering the d’ of a decision situation with the sunk
costs. As previously discussed, that individuals are incor-
porating sunk costs into their decision process appears to be
well established. However, it remains unclear whether the
sunk cost effect is driven by d’ differences or whether there
is something beyond d’ differences driving the effect. To
our knowledge, no one has ever held d’ constant between
conditions to see if sunk costs still emerge.
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1.4 Overview of studies
Two studies are presented below. Study 1 comprises be-
havioral data from a functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) study (Jessup & O’Doherty, 2011) together with un-
published pilot data. In this exploratory study, we assess the
effect of sunk costs on selecting a stochastically dominated
option. In Study 2, we attempt to replicate the findings of
Study 1 while controlling for aforementioned competing ex-
planations. We then compare the predictions of competing
psychological models to see which model best explains the
observed effect of sunk costs on selecting a stochastically
dominated option in Study 2.
Both studies utilize a unique task design; the goal of this
design is to make the task more consistent with real-world
gambling decisions than tasks found in previous stochastic
dominance studies. For example, the studies we present con-
tain a choice between three options whose outcomes are all
negatively correlated between options, whereas most pre-
vious work involved only binary choices. In addition, our
options all pay identically; they only differ on the probability
of the events occurring. We devised these two differences
in order to create a situation where subjects could simul-
taneously (1) choose a stochastically dominant option yet
(2) potentially still be more likely to choose an option that
would not win. This design is more ecologically valid in that
it replicates the roulette wheel experience while allowing for
tests of stochastic dominance violations in both the presence
and absence of sunk costs. Moreover, our task involved ani-
mation to encourage a more realistic “gambling” feel to the
task.4 All of the above elements were fixed for every instance
of our studies; hence, the critical difference in our task rela-
tive to previous studies is that we were testing whether or not
the presence of sunk costs would affect subjects’ likelihood
of choosing a stochastically dominated option.
2 Study 1
2.1 Methods
Forty subjects completed 192 experimental trials of a tri-
colored roulette wheel task with non-equiprobable events
but equal payment amounts while neuroimaging data was
simultaneously collected, totaling 40•192 = 7,680 behavioral
observations. Subjectswere divided into two groups: no cost
(n= 9) or sunk cost (n= 31). The sunk cost group represented
the entirety of the subjects analyzed in Jessup & O’Doherty
(2011) and in-depth details on the experimental protocol, as
well as an analysis of the fMRI data, can be found there.
To summarize, on each trial the subject saw a tri-colored
roulette wheel with one color covering 40% of the area and
the two other colors each covering 30% of the area (Figure
4Traditionally, studies of stochastic dominance have used static presen-
tations.
Figure 2: Tri-color roulette wheel stimulus. The green edge
at the top covers 40% of the area, and the blue and red cover
30% of the area, respectively.
2). Subjects were truthfully and explicitly informed that the
proportion of the circle covered by a certain color represented
the probability that the spinner would land on that color, and
that the spinner stopping location was independent between
trials. The optimal choice is to select the color with the
largest area on every trial. The only difference between the
two groups was in the money paid to play (sunk cost or no
cost) and the money earned for correct selection. The sunk
cost group had to pay €0.50 at the beginning of each trial
and won €2 if they selected the color on which the spinner
stopped (the expected value of selecting the optimal option
on every trial in the task was €57.60). The no cost group
did not pay anything at the beginning of each trial and won
€0.50 if they selected the color on which the spinner stopped
(the expected value of selecting the optimal option for every
trial was €38.40).
2.2 Results and discussion
While data were being collected, it appeared the two groups
were choosing quite differently. We wanted to knowwhether
this was a statistically significant difference. Due to the
unequal number of subjects between the two groups, we
used Welch’s t test to make the comparison. The overall
probability of choosing the optimal option was significantly
different between the two groups (t(18.53) = 3.01, p < .05).5
The mean choice probability for the optimal color on each
trial was .82 for those in the no cost group, but .64 for those
in the sunk cost group.
However, this finding was confounded by several factors.
First, because our data were collected simultaneously with
5When combined with additional pilot data for which subjects also had
sunk costs (though this was not collected in the scanner), the significant
effect became stronger (t(59)=3.07, p < .01).
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Table 1: Payoffs and expected value for the 2 x 2 cost group and expected value factors.
No Cost Sunk Cost
Sunk Cost Amount Win Amount Expected Value Sunk Cost Amount Win Amount Expected Value
Low expected value 0¢ 10¢ 4¢ 20¢ 60¢ 4¢
High expected value 0¢ 20¢ 8¢ 40¢ 120¢ 8¢
Note. Cost group was a between-person factor and expected value was a within-person factor. The expected values
were held constant across cost groups.
expensive-to-acquire fMRI data, our subject size was neces-
sarily small and uneven between the two groups. Therefore,
we followed up with Study 2 in order to (a) replicate the
Study 1 findings, (b) use a larger sample that was more
evenly divided between the groups, (c) control for differ-
ences in expected value between the two sunk cost groups,
and (d) examine the predictions of competing models. Us-
ing the effect size from Study 1, a power analysis revealed
that we would need 31 subjects per group in order to have a
power of .95 in study 2.
3 Study 2
3.1 Methods
Seventy-seven subjects – 37 female – completed two sets of
a roulette wheel task presented on a computer. This task was
a modified version of the task used in Jessup & O’Doherty
(2011). As there were 37 subjects in the smaller of our two
groups, this yielded a power of .98 (assuming the given effect
size).
Each subject completed two sets, each set consisting of
three 40-trial blocks, yielding 120 trials per set and 240 tri-
als overall, totaling 77·240 = 18,480 observations. Subjects
were offered a short break between the two sets. At task
completion, subjects were paid the greater of either their
total winnings or $4.00. On each trial, the subject saw a
tri-colored roulette wheel (Figure 2) with one color covering
40% of the area (dominant option) and the two other colors
each covering 30% of the area (weaker options). Subjects
were truthfully and explicitly informed that the proportion
of the circle covered by a certain color represented the prob-
ability that the spinner would land on that color, and that the
spinner stopping location was independent between trials.
The optimal choice is to select the color with the largest area
on every trial. The assigned location (top, bottom left, or
bottom right) of each color randomly differed between sub-
jects, but remained constant within subjects for the duration
of the experiment. The size of the area covered by each
color remained constant throughout each block but changed
between blocks. That is, each color covered 40% of the area
during one entire block in each three-block set. Thus, un-
like designs in prior studies, this design did not disguise the
stochastic dominance of one choice over the others.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two cost
groups: no cost or sunk cost. Subjects in the sunk cost
group were informed during the instruction phase that they
would be investing an amount in their selected color and at
the end of the task would receive all of their winnings less the
amount they invested. This sunk cost was displayed at the
beginning of each trial. In contrast, subjects in the no cost
group were not told that they would be investing an amount
in their selected because they was no cost to selecting a color.
All subjects completed one set where the expected value
was low and one set where the expected value was high.
Payoffs and expected value for dominant option are shown
in Table 1. All the low expected value trials were in one
three-block set and the high expected value trials were in
the other three-block set. The order of the sets alternated
between subjects. The expected value between low and high
conditions was held constant across the groups. On any
one trial, selecting a non-winning color resulted in neither
winning nor losing money for the no cost group but resulted
in losing money for those in the sunk cost group (e.g., note
that the expected value of a weaker option for those in the
sunk cost group during the high expected value condition
was actually negative: −40 + 120*.3 = -4).
Another important element is the d’ or sensitivity index
(Busemeyer&Townsend, 1993)which specifies the ability to
discriminate between competing stimuli. As a reminder, d’
operates similar to a t test and consists of a signal (difference
between stimuli) to noise (pooled standard deviation) ratio,
where greater absolute values indicate that the stimuli are
easier to discriminate and values near zero indicate discrim-
ination difficulty. Critically, the d’ between the dominant
and weaker options was held constant across both conditions
and both cost groups at 0.2108.6
At the beginning of each block, the text “New round,
get ready” appeared for 2000 milliseconds (ms). At the
beginning of each trial, the wheel appeared and subjects had
1500 ms to select a color. The software highlighted the
6The d’ for those in the no cost group on low expected value con-
dition trials is (4 − 3)/
√
.5 · (24 + 21) = 0.2108 and the d’ for those
in the sunk cost group on high expected value condition trials is (8 −
[−4])/
√
(.5 · (3456 + 3024) = 0.2108.
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color that the subject selected to indicate that the selection
had been recorded. At the end of the 1500ms choice phase, a
spinner appeared with a spin-time length of 3000 ms before
stopping on the winning color, remaining visible for 500
ms. The outcome next appeared and remained on screen
for 1000 ms, indicating how much the subject won on that
trial. The inter-trial interval (ITI) was drawn from a quasi-
uniform distribution varying between 200 to 1800 ms in 200
ms increments (mean 1000 ms). During the ITI, a cross-hair
symbol (+) appeared on screen for the no cost group, and the
sunk cost for the upcoming trial appeared for the sunk cost
group.
Informed consent was obtained from each subject. Except
for instructions regarding sunk cost amounts, all subjects re-
ceived identical instructions and were electronically guided
through three practice trials, and then completed three ad-
ditional practice trials in real time, with no choice feedback
given during any of these trials, given that feedback in de-
cisions from description affects choice (Jessup, Bishara &
Busemeyer, 2008).
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Statistical analysis
Of primary importance is whether or not the Study 1 re-
sult was replicated when controlling for alternative explana-
tions.7 The result did replicate. This was tested using a 2 x 2
mixed effects ANOVA, with cost group (no versus sunk) as a
between-subjects factor and expected value (low versus high)
as a within-subjects factor, resulting in two significant main
effects (cost group: F(1,75) = 4.37, p < .05; expected value:
F(1,75) = 4.08, p < .05). Those in the sunk cost group se-
lected a stochastically dominated option significantly more
than did those in the free group. Moreover, a novel find-
ing was that people chose a stochastically dominated option
significantly more when the trial’s expected value was low
compared to when it was high (the mean probabilities of
choosing a stochastically dominated option across the four
condition by group cells are presented in Figure 3A). Al-
though the difference in probabilities for choosing a stochas-
tically dominated option between expected value conditions
was normally distributed, the probability distributions for
7Before addressing this qustion, we verified that subjectswere notmerely
choosing at random. This was tested using a non-parametric signed rank
test over each subject’s probability of choosing the high probability option
Pr(Choose Hi) against a hypothesized median of .33, to reflect the fact
that there were three possible options; the test was significant (z = 7.50,
p < .001; median Pr(Choose Hi) = .59). Thus, subjects were not merely
choosing at random. We also verified that subjectswere notmerely engaging
in probability matching. This, too, was tested using the same signed rank
test, only in this case it was compared to a hypothesized median of .40 to
reflect the probability of winning the high probability option; the result of
this test was also significant (z = 6.76, p < .001; median Pr(Choose Hi)
= .59). Hence, subjects’ overall choice behavior cannot be attributed to
probability matching.
choosing a stochastically dominated option in the no cost
and sunk cost groups were not. We therefore further ana-
lyzed this data using a nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test,
which also indicated a statistical difference between the two
payment groups for the probability of choosing a stochasti-
cally dominated option (z = 2.1, p < .05).
3.2.2 Model comparison
Ordinal comparison. Next, we wanted to determine
whether any of the models that have previously accounted
for violations of stochastic dominance [i.e., prospect the-
ory with and without a shifted referent point (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979), configural weight theory (Birnbaum &
Navarrete, 1998), and decision field theory (Diederich &
Busemeyer, 1999)] could account for this pattern of results.
The predictions of these four models using typical parame-
ter values, together with those of expected utility theory, are
shown in Figure 3B-F.8 As Figure 3 clearly demonstrates,
all five of these models yield ordinally correct predictions
of the expected value main effect by successfully predicting
that violations of stochastic dominance decrease as expected
value increases. However, all except prospect theory with
the shifted reference point yield ordinally incorrect predic-
tions of the cost main effect, as each predicts that violations
of stochastic dominance decrease as sunk costs increase.
Model fitting. Given that these theories are all mathemat-
ically instantiated, their parameter values can actually be
optimized to the data. So we did this by minimizing the
negative log likelihood of each model, given the observed
marginal choice probabilities over all subjects using fmin-
search in Matlab. We chose to fit over all subjects instead
of at the individual subject level because the latter would
have proven trivial for the models to fit. It is the mismatch
in behavior between the two cost groups that was most chal-
lenging to fit, a challenge that was encountered only between
subjects. The number of free parameters for each model, to-
gether with their fitness values according to the Bayesian
Inference Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978), are displayed in
Table 2 (see the appendix for model formulas and additional
model fitting information including the best fitting parameter
values). Each of these models outperformed a 0-parameter
baseline model which had a BIC of 25,619. As indicated
by its having the lowest BIC value, prospect theory with the
shifted reference point is again the single best model, even
after adjusting for the number of free parameters. Hence,
both the ordinal and model fitting comparisons suggest that
incorporation of the risk attitudes and loss by shifting the
8In order to obtain probabilistic predictions, the deterministic models
were modified by the softmax version of the Luce choice rule (Luce, 1959).
Decision field theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) is a stochastic model
that naturally makes probabilistic predictions. See the appendix for more
details.
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Figure 3: Observed data and predicted results from 5 different models, separated by factor. The vertical axis shows the
probability of choosing a weaker option, separated by factor. The factors are expected value (low vs. high) and cost group
(no vs. sunk). The predictions displayed for all of the models were generated using typical parameter values (see appendix
for details). Prospect theory with the shifted reference point was able to account for the ordinal pattern in the observed data.
Error bars in panel A represent standard error of the mean (for expected value factor, the error bars are the standard error
of the mean difference between conditions). The data are separated by factors because the two main effects but not their
interaction were significant. Importantly, note that the parameters used to generate these predictions were not optimized to
the observed data.
reference point best accounts for the role of sunk costs in
producing stochastic dominance violations.
4 General discussion
The results of two studies indicate that individuals are more
likely to violate the stochastic dominance principle when in
a sunk cost situation and when the expected value is low
compared to high (Study 2). Interestingly, while all five
models naturally predicted the effect of expected value, none
except for prospect theory with the shifted reference point
were able to predict the effect of sunk costs.
Several conclusions can be inferred from the results. First,
these two new observations of stochastic dominance viola-
tions in individual choice complement previous observa-
tions of the violations such as when the dominance is non-
transparent and in cases where payoffs are negatively cor-
related (Birnbaum & Navarrete, 1998; Diederich & Buse-
meyer, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Second, that vi-
olations of stochastic dominance decrease as expected value
increases is not surprising. This corresponds with the find-
ing that, as the stakes are raised, so raised is the attention and
care exercised, also known as the speed/accuracy trade-off
(Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Link, 1992; Ratcliff, 1978).
However, the fact that stochastic versions of the formerly de-
terministic models captured this phenomenon is somewhat
surprising because there is nothing within these implemen-
tations that changes with expected value; nonetheless, the
observed behavior “falls out” quite effortlessly. It should
be noted that the effect size for the expected value effect is
small, though nonetheless statistically significant.
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Table 2: Number of free parameters and fitness values sep-
arated by model.
Number of Free
Parameters
BIC
Expected Utility 2 24,189
Configural Weight Theory 4 24,208
Decision Field Theory 4 24,197
Prospect Theory 6 24,228
Prospect Theory with
Shifted Reference
6 23,980
Note: The lower the BIC value the better the fit. See
the appendix for additional fit details, best fitting param-
eter values, and computation of the BIC. BIC = Bayesian
Information Criterion.
Third, the fact that sunk costs result in increased selection
of a stochastically dominated option when compared to no
costs is also surprising. It contradicts the apparent implica-
tions of the speed/accuracy trade-off, since, in this condition,
the stakes are raised by the required investment. The predic-
tions of the stochastic versions of these deterministic models
again correspond to our incorrect intuitive expectations and
hence they counter the observed behavior. Even the very
flexible models that we tested were unable to account for
these effects. Only with the incorporation of a shifted ref-
erence point together with the kinked valuation curve was a
model able to capture the observed four-fold ordinal behavior
pattern of expected value and cost group.
The observed pattern of results cannot be explained by
probability matching, randomness, loss aversion as imple-
mented within prospect theory, or the loss attention hypoth-
esis which states that losses increase the likelihood of select-
ing the most advantageous option (Yechiam & Hochman,
2013). Contrastingly, in our results, subjects who experi-
enced losses (i.e., sunk cost group) were less – not more –
likely to choose the most advantageous option. Furthermore,
because the d’, or sensitivity index, for each of the condi-
tions and groups was held constant between the dominant
and weaker options at 0.2108, the pattern also cannot be ex-
plained by the payoff variability effect (i.e., the finding that
choices become more random as the d’ approaches zero;
Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Myers, Suydam & Gam-
bino, 1965). In the present case, the payoff variability effect
would predict no choice difference between the expected
value conditions or investments groups. Thaler and Johnson
(1990) suggest that riskier choices might be more prevalent
when subjects are influenced by prior positive outcomes. In-
dividuals in their experiment were more risk-seeking after
experiencing an initial gain. These “house money” affects
cannot explain the stochastically dominated choices being
investigated here because subjects do not receive a positive
endowment or an initial gain before making choices.
An important caveat to note is that the work here involved
situations in which sunk cost is forced; it remains to be seen
if the effect holds when subjects have free choice concerning
whether or not to engage in the sunk cost task. Furthermore,
the extent to which the effect depends on having more than
two options might also be examined in future work. The
synthesis of our present work with the finding that individ-
uals are more likely to violate stochastic dominance than
groups (Charness, Karni & Levin, 2007) suggests that the
problem of inferior decision making by executives who act
alone will be exacerbated when there are costs on the line, a
problem that might be ameliorated by having many outside
and independent advisers involved in the decision making
process.
To summarize, prior research has shown that individuals
choose irrationally in the presence of sunk costs. This re-
search presents a novel connection between sunk costs and
stochastic dominance. The effect of sunk costs on choices
that contain dominated options was not predicted by any
pre-existing deterministic model of choice using reasonable
parameter values without a change of reference. Financial
investment in the form of a sunk cost results in changes to an
individual’s reference point, affecting his or her likelihood
of choosing a stochastically dominated option. In the case of
our experiment, these poor choices had only minimal conse-
quences; in the case of the LondonWhale, the consequences
were anything but minimal. The novelty of the present find-
ings, when viewed through the lens of real-world human
behavior, open new avenues for interesting future research.
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Appendix
Expected utility theory
Expected utility theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern,
1944) represents the simplest descriptive model of choice
behavior. The expected utility of an option k with J out-
comes is given by
EUk =
J∑
j=1
pju(xj) , (1)
where pj represents the probability of outcome j and xj is
the value of outcome j and u is a function that converts the
outcome to utility. We used a standard reference dependent
power function for utility,
u(xji) =
{
xα
j
, xj > 0
−(−xj)
α , xj < 0
, (2)
where α is a utility parameter that indicates an individual’s
attitude towards risk. When α > 1, an individual is risk-
seeking; α < 1 indicates risk aversion, and α = 1 indicates
risk neutrality, reducing themodel to expected value. To pro-
duce Figure 3B we used α = .81 to account for the common
finding that individuals are risk averse in the gain domain.
The optimization process for the two free parameters yielded
α = .01 and θ = .078 (see obtaining probabilistic predic-
tions from deterministic models section in the appendix for
explanation of the θ parameter).
Configural weight theory
Configural weight theory (Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997; Birn-
baum &McIntosh, 1996) has proven to be an extremely suc-
cessful model at explaining effects not predicted by cumu-
lative prospect theory and it excels at accurately predicting
stochastic dominance violations. According to this model,
the preference for an option k with two outcomes x and y
where x > y ≥ 0 is given by
CWT(xk) = wHu(x) + wLu(y) , (3)
where u(•) represents the standard power function for utility
with utility parameter α, and the relative weight wH on the
high outcome x is given by
wH =
aHS(p)
aH · S(p) + aL · S(1 − p)
. (4)
Here, aH and aL are configural weights that for the high
and low outcomes, respectively, S(•) represents a probability
weighting function of the form pγ. The relative weight for
the lowest outcome wL = 1−wH . To produce Figure 3C the
parameter values were aH = .37, aL = 1− aH , α = 1, γ = .6
(Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997). The optimization process for
the four free parameters yielded aH = 1, α = .01, γ = 2, and
θ = .01. Parameter aL was fixed at 1 - aH . Unfortunately,
when the options have binary outcomes configural weight
theory produces predictions virtually indistinct from those
of cumulative prospect theory (Birnbaum & Chavez, 1997;
Birnbaum & McIntosh, 1996). Nonetheless, because this
is a very flexible model that has successfully accounted for
previous violations of stochastic dominance, we still wanted
to see if it could predict the observed effects.
Decision field theory
Decision field theory is a dynamic and stochastic model of
choice that has found awide variety of application in both tra-
ditional behavioral decision making literature, and, owing to
its neural network structure and similarity with neural behav-
ior (Ditterich, Mazurek & Shadlen, 2003; Gold & Shadlen,
2007), has managed to bridge the behavioral literature with
the neuroscience literature (Busemeyer, Jessup, Johnson
& Townsend, 2006). There are multiple versions of this
model for both binary and multi-alternative choice, includ-
ing models with both externally- and internally-controlled
stopping times. Predictions were generated using both stop-
ping time approaches and they yielded qualitatively identi-
cal answers. Because it has known solutions, we are using
the externally-controlled stopping rule version (Roe, Buse-
meyer, & Townsend, 2001) for the model fitting procedure
as opposed to the internally-controlled version which must
be simulated.
In decision field theory, preferences for options are accu-
mulated until they reach a predetermined decision threshold
θ. The accumulation of preference in this model is best
described using matrix notation and preferences at time t
accumulate according to
P(t) = S · P(t − 1) + V(t) , (5)
where P represents a preference vector of length K , where K
= the total number of options; S is a K by K feedback matrix;
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 13, No. 6, November 2018 Sunk cost and stochastic dominance 585
and V(t) is a valence vector of length K , representing the
valence for each option at each moment. The main diagonal
coordinates sii in the feedback matrix allow for decay and
the off-diagonal coordinates allow for lateral inhibition of
competing alternatives. The valence vector is described by
V(t) = C ·M · w(t) + N(0, σ) , (6)
where C is a K by K comparison matrix; M is a K by J
motivational matrix, representing the J options outcomes
for each option k on the columns; w(t) is an attentional
weight vector of length J; and N(0, σ) is a normally dis-
tributed noise factor with a mean drift rate of 0 and stan-
dard deviation of σ, representing the diffusion rate. For a
more in-depth treatment of the model, see Roe et al. (2001).
The predictions shown in Figure 3D were obtained using
5000 simulations for each condition and group combination
(i.e., 2 · 2 · 5000 = 20, 000 total simulations) with the fol-
lowing parameter values: sii = 1, θ = 4, σ = .05; the
lateral inhibition parameter connecting the high probability
to the low probability options shigh_low = slow_high = −.05;
and the lateral inhibition parameter connecting the two low
probability options slow_low = −.1. The optimization pro-
cess for the four free parameters yielded θ = 50, σ = 2.0,
shigh_low = slow_high = −.16, and slow_low = −.06. The feed-
back parameter was not fit but rather fixed at sii = .95.
Prospect theory
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) represents a
major advance beyond expected utility that is able to capture
a wide variety of choice patterns that expected utility theory
cannot.
The prospect V for option k is defined as
Vk =
J∑
j
pi(pj) · v(xj) (7)
where v(xj) represents the S-shaped value function from a
neutral reference point for option x and outcome xj j. In
practice, this was implemented according to
u(xi) =
{
xα
j
, xj > 0
−(−xj · λ)
β , xj < 0
, (8)
where α is a utility parameter for gains and β is a utility pa-
rameter for losses. The loss aversion parameter λ is a multi-
plier that increases the impact of losses relative to equivalent
gains. The probability weighting function for positive out-
comes pi+(pj) is used to modify the probability p of each
outcome j and is operationalized according to (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992)
pi+(pj) =
pγ
(pγ + 1 − pγ)1/γ
, (9)
where γ is a probability weighting parameter such that γ < 1
yields overweighting of rare events, γ > 1 yields under-
weighting of rare events and γ = 1 yields objective weight-
ing of rare events. The probability weighting function for
negative outcomes pi−(pj) is identical in form except that
a different free parameter δ is used in place of γ. In ac-
cordance with Tversky and Kahneman (1979), the weighted
probabilities need not sum to unity. To produce Figure 3E the
parameter values used were α = β = .88, γ = .61, δ = .69,
and λ = 2.25 (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The optimiza-
tion process for the six free parameters yielded α = .01,
β = 2, γ = .36, δ = .01, λ = .01, and θ = .01.
Prospect Theory with Reference Shift
This version is identical to prospect theory except that, when
losses are the default (e.g., in the sunk cost group), the max-
imum outcome is subtracted from all outcomes. This al-
lows the maximal outcome to become the new origin for the
kinked value function.
xj −MAX(x) for all j , (10)
The parameters used to produce Figure 3F were the same as
those used to produce 3E. The optimization process for the
six free parameters yielded α = .11, β = .14, γ = 2, δ = .57,
λ = 2, and θ = .06.
Obtaining probabilistic predictions from deter-
ministic models
Expected utility theory, prospect theory, and configural
weight theory all make deterministic predictions, unlike de-
cision field theory. Given that individual –much less group –
behavior is not deterministic, it is essential that some mech-
anism be used to convert the deterministic predictions into
probabilistic predictions. The softmax implementation (Sut-
ton & Barto, 1998) of the Luce choice rule (Luce, 1959) is a
commonly used conversion method. Our particular version
is computed as follows:
pk =
eMk /θ
Σ
K
k
eMk /θ
. (11)
Here, Pk represents the probability of selecting option k
out of the set of K options, Mk represents the value from
the deterministic model (whether a utility or prospect) for
option k, and θ represents the temperature parameter on the
range 0 < θ < ∞. Our formulation uses the inverse of the
temperature parameter so that values near 0 result in more
deterministic choice behavior whereas increases in θ result
in increasingly random choice behavior. We used θ = .02 to
produce the results displayed in Figure 3 for all deterministic
models.
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Bayesian Information Criterion
The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is a model com-
parison method that can be used to compare multiple non-
nested models. The BIC is computed as
BICi = −2 · LLi + ln(N) · k , (12)
where LLi represents the (natural) log likelihood of model
i, N is the number of data points or observations, and k is
the number of free parameters in the model. The term after
the plus sign can be thought of as a penalty for added model
complexity, represented by the number of free parameters. In
study 2, each additional free parameter within amodel adds a
penalty value of ln(77 · 240) = 9.824 because we optimized
over all 77 subjects and each subject had 240 trials. The
lower the BIC value, the better the fit.
Baseline Model
To insure that our models were performing better than
chance we compared them to a 0-parameter baseline model
that makes the simplifying assumption that each of the
77 subjects chose the dominant option 50% of the time
over all 240 trials. The log likelihood of this model is
ln(.5) · 77 · 240 and the BIC value of this model is sim-
ply −2 · LLBaseline = 25, 619. In order to outperform this
baseline model – and consequently yield a lower BIC value
– the subjects must choose in ways that systematically de-
viate from chance behavior and a competing experimental
model must efficiently detect and adjust accordingly to these
deviations. A 0-parameter baseline model that chose the
dominant option either 40% of the time – to correspond with
probability matching – or 33% of the time – to correspond
with pure guessing – would have fared even worse than the
version we used.
